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Anaphora by pronouns 
BERND WIESE 
Abstract 
An adequate conception of anaphora is still a desideratum. Considering the 
anaphoric use of third-person personal pronouns, the present study contri-
butes to the solution of the question of what anaphora is. Major tenets of 
generative approaches to pronominal anaphora are surveyed; descriptive 
and methodological problems with transformational as weil as interpretive 
treatments are discussed. The prevailing assumption that anaphora is a 
syntactically based phenomenon is shown tobe inadequate. In particular, it 
is argued that pronominal anaphora does not constitute a case of eilher a 
syntactic ( agreement) relation or a semantic ( coreference) relation be-
tween antecedents and anaphors, i.e. linguistic expressions. Infact, there is 
no grammatical antecedent-anaphor relation that is essential to the descrip-
tion of pronouns. Pronouns are to be treated in their own right rather than 
by recourse to supposed antecedents. An account of the use of pronouns has 
to be based on a notion of speaker reference and on a unified description of 
/exical entries for pronouns that specify their meanings. Sampie entries for 
Eng/ish are suggested. It is emphasized that pronoun meanings rej/ect social, 
not biological, classifications of possible referents. To the extent that 
pronouns are used according to morphosyntactic features, as in /anguages 
like German or French, /exical entries for pronouns should specify the 
pronouns' 'associative potential'. Associative potential has the samefunction 
as conceptual meaning, viz. delimiting the associated extension. In addition 
to this, pronouns turn out to differ from 'normal definite nominals' only in 
the low conceptual content of their meanings. Pronoun occurrences that 
apparently agree with and are coreferential with referential antecedents are 
found to form a restricted subclass of pronoun use in generat as weil as of 
anaphoric pronoun use. Thus one must refrainfromforcing each and every 
pronoun occurrence into this mold. Instead, anaphora by pronouns is 
characterized as a type of use where pronouns serve to refer to referents that 
the speaker considers to be retrievable from the universe-of-discourse. 
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0. Introduction* 
For two decades now the treatment of anaphora by pronouns has been a 
prominent field ofinterest within syntax and semantics. Unfortunately, in 
spite of immense research expenditure, what has been achieved is 
anything but a uniform and generally accepted approach to pronominal 
anaphora, let alone a uniform grammar of pronouns in general. In the 
light of this, it seems advisable to reconsider the basic assumptions that 
have guided these endeavors. If there is any one shared conviction 
underlying most treatments of the subject, it can probably be formulated 
as follows: pronominal anaphora is to be construed as a grammatical 
relation of some kind between certain linguistic expressions called antece-
dents and anaphors. The main point I want to argue for is that this 
assumption has to be repudiated; I submit that there is no grammatical 
antecedent-anaphor relation which is essential to the description of 
personal pronouns. 
In order to revive the fundamental question of how the concept of 
anaphora is to be construed, I will consider some of the different 
relational approaches found in the Iiterature- but not primarily for their 
own sake; the theories to be discussed will serve as examples of certain 
theoretical positions one might take in attempting to substantiate the 
relational idea. Problems any relational approach faces will thus be 
brought to attention. From this point ofview, even the classical pronomi-
nalization theory is still of some interest insofar as the crucial theoretical 
attitude of this approach has survived within generative grammar. By this 
I mean the decision - as argued for in the classical paper by Lees and 
Klima (1963) - to handle anaphora as a syntactically based phenome-
non. 
There are two main arguments to this effect. The first one rests upon the 
assumption that there are constraints on anaphora that have to be 
formulated in terms of syntactic configurations. In this paper I will not go 
into the question of configurational constraints. But let me note that there 
is a tendency in recent publications to construe such constraints as 'a 
syntactic reflex' (Smith 1981: 236) ofphenomena properly tobe explained 
in semantic or pragmatic terms (see e.g. Dowty 1980; Reinhart 1983). The 
pertinent facts may quite adequately be explained by general principles of 
utterance interpretation and thus may not give rise to the conjecture that 
anaphora has a syntactic basis. 
The second argument is based on the supposition that anaphora 
constitutes a case ofsyntactic agreement. The refutation ofthis conviction 
will be a primary subject of the first half of this paper. The second half will 
be devoted to questions of semantics. Pronouns' meanings are examined, 
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and it is argued that antecedent-anaphor relations are not needed for 
semantic reasons either. Instead, anaphora by pronouns has to be 
explained as a type of pronoun use which must be characterized in 
pragmatic terms. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Starting with a discussion 
of treatments of the subject within generative syntax, I examine which 
form a syntactic approach would have to take, if it were to figure as a 
possibly adequate theory of pronominal anaphora at all (section 1). The 
idea that anaphorically related items have to meet a condition of 
agreement has to date nearly always been adhered to. In section 2 a 
number of cases are enumerated where such a condition fails. Further 
support is given to the thesis that pronominal anaphora must not be 
construed as a syntactic phenomenon in section 3. Consequently, agree-
ment as a condition on anaphora by pronouns should be dispensed with. 
In section 4, concentrating on gender, I show that an agreement condition 
is in fact not needed either for English - a language that has 'natural' 
gender- or for languages like German where gender is a morphosyntac-
tic classification of words. More generally speaking, conditions on 
antecedent-anaphor re1ations can be dispensed with in the description of 
pronominal anaphora if the pronouns' meanings (or what I call their 
associative potentials) are seen to contro1 the pronouns' use. These are 
discussed to some extent in section 5. In section 6, I try to show that an 
approach which takes coreference as basic must fai1 if coreference is 
presumed to be an 'intra1inguistic' relation that can be described without 
recourse to considerations of extra1inguistic reference. On the contrary, 
considerations of speaker reference must not be neg1ected. Thus a 
semantic re1ationa1 approach whereby the reference of pronouns is to be 
fixed via antecedent-anaphor re1ations has to be rejected too. Instead, 
pronouns are regarded as picking up referents that are made avai1able in 
the context. Section 7 shows that this idea can also be applied in the case 
of so-called 'bound-variable pronouns'. Finally, section 8, introduced by 
a summary of arguments, provides some discussion of the resulting 
conception of what it means for a pronoun to be used anaphorically. 
I. The form of a syntactic approach 
Treating anaphora as a syntactically based phenomenon was no new idea 
originating from generative grammar. With respect to languages 1ike 
German that show a more complex system of morphosyntactic features 
than English, the assumption that a pronoun 'agrees' in gender and number 
with that noun to which it 'refers back' (cf. e.g. Paul1919: § 164) has a 1ong 
Bereitgestellt von | Institut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS) Bibliothek
Angemeldet | 193.196.8.102
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.13 11:09
376 B. Wiese 
tradition. According to the transfonnational approach, a pronoun is a 
surface-structure substitute for an underlying 'full NP'. This NP has to be 
structurally and lexically identical to the NP which serves as the pronoun's 
antecedent. This identity condition thus covers the phenomena that have 
been traditionally treated under the caption of 'agreement'. 
When a formulation of pronominalization rules is attempted, one 
problern area for any relational approach immediately becomes apparent: 
the delimitation of the antecedent which may be unclear. Paradigm cases 
are 'split antecedents' (cf. [I] from Wasow 1979: 75, n. 2) and 'Bach-
Peters sentences' (cf. [2] from Bach 1970: 122): 
(I) John told his wife that they had been evicted. 
(2) I gave the book that he wanted to the man who asked for it. 
A split antecedent lohn ... his wife for they in (I) obviously does not meet 
the identity condition. 1 As for (2), taking the book that he wanted and the 
man who asked for it as the antecedents of it and he, respectively, we are 
led into an infinite regress of 'inverted substitutions'. We may propose to 
define at least one of the antecedents so as to exclude the relative clause. 
But this will not only leave us with severe semantic problems (cf. Quine 
1960: § 23; Daly 1975: 19f.); pronominalization may also give ungramma-
tical results if relative clauses are neglected (cf. below). 
Even worse, the mere fact that pronouns may be used nonanaphori-
cally means that not every pronoun has an antecedent. To provide for 
nonanaphoric pronouns too, Chomsky (1965) suggested assuming the 
existence of pronouns in deep structures (underlying nonanaphoric 
pronouns). Nevertheless, he insisted on employing a pronominalization 
transformation in order to explain ambiguities with respect to [ ± ana-
phoric] in terms of different sources of pronouns. 
The Aspects treatment of pronouns was rejected by Dougherty (1969). 
lt was daimed to be 'descriptively inadequate' since it obscured the 
uniformity of anaphoric and nonanaphoric personal pronouns. In general 
- that is, 'in positions where nouns and non-anaphoric pronouns can 
freely occur' (Chomsky I977: 127, n. 12)- any personal pronoun that 
may be given an anaphoric interpretation may also be understood 
nonanaphorically. This fact ('the anaporn relation') should be accounted 
for by an adequate theory. But the 'two-sources approach' cuts across 
what appears to be a natural dass of phenomena by distinguishing 
anaphoric personal pronouns from nonanaphoric ones. 2 
Wasow makes a somewhat similar point though he formulates it in a 
methodological vein as a kind of 'entities-are-not-to-be-multiplied-with-
out-necessity argument'. Talking about Leesand Klima (1963), he states 
(I979: 13) that 
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It seems doubtful ... that they could have intended their Pronominalization 
transformation to account for non-anaphoric pronouns. Under these circum-
stances, one wonders why they proposed the transformation at all, for they could 
have accounted for anaphoric pronouns with whatever mechanism they meant to 
use in deriving non-anaphoric pronouns. 
Beyond this there are methodological flaws. Within the transforma-
tional approach the semantic difference between repeated nominals and 
NP-pronoun pairs has to be ensured by some special mechanism, viz. 
indexing: lexical items that are 'referentials' are assigned referential 
indices in the deep structure where sameness of index means identity of 
reference. Without this proviso, it would not be possible to distinguish 
between the deep structure of sentences (3) and ( 4) and they would thus be 
synonymous: 
(3) The boy hurt himself. 
(4) The boy hurt the boy. 
But the formal differences of the surface sentences (3) and (4) are clearly 
sufficient to explain the differences in semantic interpretation. Obviously, 
the necessity of amending deep structures by introducing indices simply 
stems from the fact that the formal difference in surface structure has been 
abstracted away from the very structures that are supposed to be input to 
the semantic component - a dilemma which is, in fact, typical of the 
Aspects framework (cf. Wiese 1980). The 'solution' consists in creating a 
technical device that reintroduces into deep structures information which 
is available in the surface structure anyway- quite obviously an artifact 
of the theory. 
From a semantic point of view, anaphora was taken to constitute 
coreference. Now, if one wants to treat anaphora, or for that matter 
coreference, as a syntactically based phenomenon, one must be able to 
identify relevant syntactic properties of syntactic units. But once referen-
tial indices are available within syntax they tend to live their own life. 
Identity of referential indices was made a condition on pronominaliza-
tion. Thus the desired semantic result was guaranteed by introducing a 
mechanism of no intrinsic descriptive value into those syntactic structures 
that are to be interpreted semantically: the relationship between the 
syntactic and the semantic is turned upside down. 
What we are concerned with here is not simply a weakness of some now 
out-of-date theory. Our methodological objection applies not only to the 
Aspects approach but to any approach to anaphora thatrelies in a similar 
way on having indices or variables in syntactic structures (hence it applies 
to quite a number of treatments that are still in circulation). So let me 
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elaborate the criticism a little. A comparison of indexing in Aspects with a 
common practice in logic of representing pronouns as bound variables 
will bring out more clearly what is wrong with the former. Peirce 
suggested that, for the purpose of syntactic disambiguation, one might 
use letters as in (5) and (6), assuming 'that like letters shall stand for the 
same thing' (1960: 162): 
(5) John (A) told Bill (B) that he (A) had to go. 
(6) John (A) told Bill (B) that he (B) had to go. 
Peirce noted that he borrowed such cross-reference letters from the 
language of law. He thus implies that indexing letters serve a purpose 
within a certain regimented variety of a language. Quine, in his discussion 
of 'ambiguities ... of pronominal reference' (1960: 135), follows Peirce 
and observes that adoption of 'arbitrary letters used for cross-reference 
[that] are called variables' (1960: 136) from mathematicallanguage- that 
is, 'the resort to variables ... to clear up structural ambiguities' (1960: 157) 
- is appropriate for 'practical temporary departures from ordinary 
language' (1960: 157). Similarly, Richard Montague used variables to 
represent pronouns in constructing an artificial language that was in-
tended to represent a fragment of English (Montague 1974). In discussing 
the theory of definite descriptions, he took the view that such an artificial 
language 'should not attempt ... to mirrar English too closely' (1974: 216) 
if simplicity and avoiding ambiguities are given priority. 
The high value of regimented language e.g. for scientific purposes 
cannot be disputed. However, it is equally obvious that extending a 
naturallanguage by devices that eliminate ambiguities, in this case devices 
that make anaphoric relations unambiguous, is one thing; discovering 
devices actually used in naturallanguage is another. The thesis rejected by 
Peirce that 'no conceivable syntax could wholly remove the ambiguity 
[of a sentence like (5/6)]' (1960: 162) is equivocal: trivially, a syntax 
constructed for disambiguation can do it while a descriptive syntax 
cannot. I should like to reemphasize Montague's more prudent assertion, 
'English sentences contain no variables' (1974: 216) and would like 
to add that English sentences do not contain indices, either. Introducing 
indices into syntactic descriptions of English sentences substitutes a 
syntactic basis of anaphora in lieu of demonstrating that there is one 
(provided they are not meant to be simply an arbitrary notational device 
for indicating the existence of a relation that is determined independently, 
see below). 
The interpretive approach advanced by Dougherty (1969) claimed to 
overcome the shortcomings demonstrated. Dougherty abandons the idea 
of considering pronouns as substitutes for nominals: A uniform treatment 
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of anaphoric and nonanaphoric pronouns is aimed at by introducing all 
pronouns into deep structures. Finally, pronouns are not indexed for 
reference in deep structure, 'lnstead, the possible referent of a pronoun is 
determined by an interpretive rule' (Dougherty 1969: 492). Dougherty 
considers his rules to be of a semantic nature because they are designed to 
specify possible referents for anaphoric pronouns. As a matter of fact, 
semantic information is not used for specifying whether an anaphoric 
relation holds. Dougherty's proposal should therefore be construed as the 
specification of a syntactic relation; 3 more precisely, as a formulation of 
conditions that two given constituents must satisfy for the relation to hold 
between them. Let us call this syntactic relation 'anaphora relation' to 
distinguish it from an anaphoric relationship in a pretheoretical sense. 
Within the process of the composition of sentence meaning, existence of 
an anaphora relation may establish coreference provided certain addi-
tional conditions are satisfied. 
As a result of all this we have arrived at the following clarification: IF 
anaphora is a syntactically based phenomenon, it should be accounted for 
by specifying a syntactic relation, which in turn receives a semantic 
interpretation. (No importance need be attached to the kind ofnotational 
device for relations used; indexing is one.) What, then, could be the 
conditions on the existence of syntactic anaphora relations? Leaving aside 
configurational conditions, the upsbot of Dougherty's rule is indeed very 
simple: a pronoun may be anaphorically related to a noun if, and only if, 
both agree with respect to number, person, and gender. Thus we are led 
back to the traditional position that served as our point of departure. The 
interpretive approach is appealing, so much so that it has remained the 
prevailing view in generative grammar that anaphora IS a syntactically 
based phenomenon, i.e. that anaphoric relationships may be determined 
by a combination of syntactic conditions. In particular, while the 
theoretical status and the empirical content of configurational conditions 
became the subject of an open-ended debate, the agreement condition was 
generally taken for granted in spite of 'exceptions' that were recognized. 
Wasow - defending the interpretive approach - for instance, states 
(1979: 53), 'One essentially trivial condition on pronominal anaphora is 
that the pronoun must agree with its antecedent in person, number, and 
gender.' This conviction, it must be emphasized, is not, however, a matter 
of affiliation with a specific theoretical school. Reference to 'the require-
ment of nurober and gender agreement between the anaphor and its 
antecedent' (Kamp 1981: 283, quoted as an arbitrary example) can be 
found in most publications on the subject up to this very day. Let me then 
turn to an examination of the validity of this condition. 
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2. Problems with agreement 
Split antecedents had been a problern for the transformational approach 
and they present a problern for the interpretive theory too. Of course, 
some difficulties (concerning morphemic identity of constituents and 
lacking lexical material; see Dougherty 1969) vanish, but do split antece-
dents actually meet the 'identity condition' of the new approach, i.e. the 
agreement condition? This is often supported by the claim that split 
antecedents agree with plural anaphors (e.g. Wasow 1979: 75, n. 2). Yet it 
is hard to see any sense in construing e.g. John ... his wife (i.e. two 
separated singular constituents) in (I) above as SYNTACTICALLY plural. 
Interestingly enough, Dougherty does not advance a rule for split 
antecedents. Split antecedents may even be anaphorically related to 
singular pronouns (cf. [7] from Karttunen 1977: 60): 
(7) If Mary has a car or John has a bicycle it is in the garage. 
Anaphora relations therefore cannot be established simply by considering 
the syntactic features of the (split) antecedent- whatever they may be-
and the anaphor. Incidentally, there are also 'split anaphors'. Their 
antecedent may be either plural or singular; cf. (8), (9): 
(8) Two hotel guests kissed in the reception hall. He seemed to like her a 
lot. 
(9) A married couple kissed in the reception hall. He seemed to like her a 
lot. 
Identity in number is not a trivial condition, as is already shown by 
Dougherty's own data (1969), cf. (10): 
(10) Curval and Durcet each deftowered a girl and I knew them both. 
Such cases of nonagreement in number led Dougherty to the assumption 
that his rules cannot apply to surface structures but involve intermediate 
structures ordered at a stage at least before conjunction reduction. A 
structure corresponding to (10) should include 'Curval deftowered a girl' 
as weil as 'Durcet deftowered a girl'. At this Ievel both of them should have 
a split antecedent a girl ... a girl. This, Dougherty thought, should pose 
no special problems, as one would need a rule for sp1it antecedents 
anyway. However, localizing the assignment of anaphora at an intermedi-
ate Ievel begs the problem, for split antecedents in turn constitute a 
dubious case of syntactic agreement between pronoun and antecedent. 
Nonagreement between pronouns and antecedents is much more 
common than the 'exceptions' referred to in the Iiterature would seem to 
suggest. As regards number, cf. (11) from Wasow (1979: 75 n. 2) and (12) 
from Hintikka and Carlson (1977: 20): 
Bereitgestellt von | Institut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS) Bibliothek
Angemeldet | 193.196.8.102
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.13 11:09
Anaphora by pronouns 381 
(II) John bought a Veg-o-matic, after seeing them advertised on TV. 
(12) One contestant gave his answer orally while others wrote them 
down. 
Cf. also (13) from Carlson (1977): 
(13) Kelly is seeking this kind of animal, and Horace is seeking itjthem 
as weil. 
Carlson (1977: 437 n. 17) comments, 'I am not sure why this variation of 
pronominal form is tolerated, but sometimes one, and then the other, 
seems preferable.' Another type of nonagreement in number is found in 
colloquial British English, where they may be used 'as a convenient means 
of avoiding the dilemma of whether to use the he or she form' (Quirk and 
Greenbaum 1973: 182): 
(14) Everyone thinks they have the answer. 
Additional examples have been collected by Pulgram (1978). 
Nonagreement in number is widespread in English but nonagreement 
in gender can only be shown in a language like German. The reason is 
simply the following: contrary to what is assumed by Dougherty and 
Wasow, it does not seem tobe an indisputable fact that there is a formal, 
i.e. morphosyntactic, gender system in English. In German, however, 
gender IS a syntactic classification. This is obvious where grammatical and 
'natural' gender do not coincide. Any reference grammar provides 
examples like (15) and (16) (cf. also Corbett 1979: 205): 
(15) Ich habe das Mädchen gesehen, wie es das Haus verließ. 
'I saw the girl as she left home.' 
In (15) the neuter pronoun es is anaphorically related to a neuter 
antecedent. However, as the referent of the antecedent is female, one 
may also choose a feminine pronoun; cf. ( 16): 
(16) Ich habe das Mädchen gesehen, wie sie das Haus verließ. 
'I saw the girl as she left home.' 
Suppose, for argument's sake, that personal pronouns in Eng1ish do fall 
within the domain of a formal gender system. This system would 
presumably have to include a classification such as 'animate vs. inani-
mate'. A noun like ship would belong to inanimate since it is compatible 
with which but not with who. If anaphoric personal pronouns are to agree 
with their antecedents, ship could only figure as an antecedent to it. 
Insofar as she is used as an anaphor to ship, we may take this again as a 
counterexample to the agreement condition. Regardless of how we 
construe gender in English, agreement in gender is no proper condition 
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for anaphora: either gender agreement does not apply to English personal 
pronouns, or it is not a necessary condition. 
As far as person is concerned, identity of features cannot be a relevant 
condition, for nouns (other than pronouns) are not classified for person. 
Agreement in person may be construed as compatibility between third-
person personal pronouns and nouns. Since anaphora by pronouns is 
limited to third-person personal anaphors (cf. n. 25), there is no possibil-
ity of violating this condition, and it may simply be dropped; if agreement 
in person were an empirical condition, it would have to be responsible for 
blocking anaphora in sentences like (17) ( cf. Wasow 1979: 53) where there 
is a pronominal antecedent: 
(17) I deny that he is a communist. 
Insofar as in (17) an anaphoric interpretation relating he to I is indeed 
blocked, this is not due to syntactic reasons: under normal conditions one 
must not use a personal pronoun other than the first-person personal 
pronoun for referring to oneself. But note that in an utterance of (17), he 
may weil be used to refer to the speaker if accompanied by a pointing 
gesture. 
In summary, analysis of the allegedly trivial agreement condition Ieads 
to the following result for English. Agreement in person is an empty 
requirement and therefore trivial indeed; agreement in gender either does 
not apply or is not necessary for anaphora; and nurober agreement is 
again not a necessary condition. Agreement may not be a sufficient 
condition either.4 Dougherty (1969: 517) presents (18) as an example 
where no anaphoric interpretation is possible although the agreement 
condition is satisfied (but cf. below): 
(18) Curval and Durcet each deflowered a girl and I knew her. 
Here again Dougherty has to resort to intermediate structures for 
anaphora (non)assignment; cf. also (19): 
(19) Ein Traktat, {ddas [neut.]} Fritz bewunderte, gefiel Kar! nicht, weil 
en [masc.] 
er [masc.] aus Deutschland stammte. 
'A treatise that Fritz admired did not please Kar! because itjhe 
came from Germany.' 
The NP ein Traktat 'a treatise' may be either masculine or neuter. On 
principle, it may thus figure as an antecedent to er (masc.) or es (neut.). 
However, there is no way to decide whether er may in fact be related to 
Traktat in (19) without taking recourse to the gender of the relative 
pronoun, das (neut.) or den (masc.). But now it is Dougherty's solution of 
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the Bach-Peters paradox to take nouns, not NPs, as the antecedents of 
personal pronouns. Therefore he must consider only the anteceding head 
noun when interpreting the personal pronoun in (19) and cannot exclude 
an anaphoric interpretation relating er to Traktat even in cases where the 
relative pronoun reads das (neut.). This means that agreement is not a 
sufficient condition on anaphora with antecedents that are ambiguous 
with respect to syntactic features. By restricting antecedents to head 
nouns, it is true, Dougherty avoids being led into an infinite regress when 
dealing with Bach-Peters sentences. But like others who followed him, he 
overlooks the other horn of the dilemma: the syntactic features of the 
head noun of an NP may not suffice to determine whether it may enter 
into an anaphoric relationship to a given pronoun. 5 Consequently, 
Dougherty's treatment of the Bach-Peters paradox and the assumption 
that agreement is a sufficient condition on anaphora are incompatible. 
3. The failure of the interpretive approach 
How should we react? Recognizing the miscarriage of the transforma-
tional approach, Bach had suggested that we should Iook for 'a semantic 
relation between independently chosen NPs and pronouns (from the 
base), a relation which must then be determined (at least) on the basis of 
surface structure relations' (1970: 122). The unrestricted agreement 
condition that was meant to apply at some intermediate Ievel does not 
work. We may still adopt Bach's proposal: the unrestricted agreement 
condition may be replaced by a more complex surface-structure determi-
nation of the anaphora relation. 
Different cases of anaphora must then be distinguished. Assurne for now 
that nurober and gender are indeed syntactic features pertinent to 
anaphora -·- whether this is so depends on the language we are describing. 
First, consider the case in which a pronoun and a noun agree in all relevant 
features. Anaphoric interpretation is, as a rule, possible, but if a certain 
additional condition, say IX, is satisfied, anaphora may be prohibited, such 
as in (18). In ( 10) and (18), more than one girl must be under discussion and 
this is what determines which pronoun may occur anaphorically. Dough-
erty presumes the reason to be the fact that no girl can be deflowered more 
than once. But then the semantics of the verb deflower must be among the 
factors that preclude an anaphoric interpretation of the pronoun in (18). 
Thus in IX - presumably not a simple condition - we have to refer to a 
dass of verbs that indudes deflower. Probably this dass can only be 
determined by a semantic criterion. Apart from IX, there may be other 
conditions ß, y, etc., that predude anaphora despite agreement. 
Second, a pronoun and a noun may agree with respect to gender but 
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not with respect to number. Anaphoric interpretation is, as a rule, not 
possible, but if a certain additional condition, say a 1, is satisfied, 
anaphora may still be allowed (cf. [11]). Further formal conditions may be 
included in a1, e.g. that the pronoun is plural while the supposed 
antecedent is singular and indefinite, but a 1 is likely to include semantic 
conditions as weil, e.g. that the antecedent is interpreted as nonspecific. 
Third, a pronoun and a noun may agree with respect to number but not 
with respect to gender. Again we need an additional condition, say a2. 
Applying a2, we would have to account for those cases traditionally 
labeled constructio ad sensum. As the Latin term indicates, it is the 
meaning of the antecedent that permits the choice of an anaphoric 
pronoun which does not agree with the antecedent. (For more examples 
from German, cf. Paul 1919: § 166.) Thus we would have to mention a 
noun class including nouns like ship (or Mädchen, in German) -
obviously a class that can only be defined with the help of semantic 
criteria. Following this strategy we would replace the seemingly simple 
agreement condition by a complex theorem of the form (20): 
(20) Let f1 and f2 be syntactic constituents of a syntagma f with respect 
to a syntactic structure s. f1 is anaphorically related to f2 only if (A) 
and (B): 
(A): f1 is a pronoun in s and f2 is a noun in s. 
(B): Either (B1) or (B2) or (83) ... 
(B1): f1 and f2 agree with respect to gender and number, 
and not (1/t). 
(1/t): (a) or (ß) or (y) ... 
(82): f1 and f2 agree with respect to gender and do not 
agree with respect to number, and (</>). 
(</>): (a1) or (ßl) or (yl) ... 
(83): f1 and f2 agree with respect to number and do not 
agree with respect to gender, and (x). 
(x): (a2) or (ß2) or (y2) ... 
I do not intend to advance such a theorem. I use (20) to stress that the 
formal agreement condition would have to be weakened in a drastic 
manner. Subcases where anaphora does hold in spite of nonagreement as 
weil as subcases where anaphora does not hold in spite of agreement 
would have to be specified at least partly in semantic terms. In general, 
every 'greek-letter clause' in (20) will contain semantic information. 
Wasow (1979: 57) remarked on an anaphora rule of Postal's that 
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It seems somewhat unnatural that a rule of grammar ... which defines a criterion 
for anaphora in purely syntactic terms should have classes of exceptions which 
can be characterized only in semantic terms. 
Exactly this Situation holds for the agreernent condition proposed by 
Wasow hirnself. More precisely, our atternpt to rescue the interpretive 
agreernent condition has failed for nonaccidental reasons. At the very 
least, a solution that escapes Wasow's own criticisrn is preferable. 
Anaphora theorerns of type (20) would have to go beyond the 
agreernent condition and not only by introducing sernantic clauses: 
referring to properties of the antecedent and the anaphor would not be 
enough, properties of other constituents would also be involved (e.g. 
rneanings of verbs, as exernplified above). We rnay here consider another 
type of problern for the interpretive approach, the problern of 'rnissing 
antecedents'. The following exarnples corne frorn a study by Grinderand 
Postal (1971) devoted to this topic: 
(21) Harry doesn't have a wife but Bill does and she is a nag. 
(22) Harry sank a destroyer and so did Bill and they both went down 
with all hands. 
Assurning that she in (21) refers to Bill's wife and that they in (22) refers to 
the destroyers sunk by Harry and Bill, any syntactically based theory of 
anaphora is confronted with the problern that there are no proper 
antecedents for deriving these readings. 6 As a solution, Grinder and 
Postal argued for the existence of the 'rnissing antecedents' in underlying 
structures. The interpretivists, who reject a transformational approach to 
anaphora (in this case, VP anaphora), would have to opt for 'a theory of 
antecedent-anaphor relations in which the antecedents are, in sorne cases 
at least, not syntactic elements' (1971: 276). But as noted by Grinderand 
Postal, distinguishing between two types of antecedents as sernantic or 
syntactic is hardly reasonable because they in (22) would be assigned 
sornething like a rnixed split antecedent, one syntactic (a destroyer), the 
other sernantic ('a destroyer') - obviously an absurdity. 
In defence of the interpretive approach, Wasow (1979: 110) has tried to 
counter this argurnent by the empty-structure hypothesis, which 'involves 
generating anaphors which Iook just like their antecedents, except that 
lexical insertion need not have taken place.' Presumably (21) would 
contain a null anaphor which has the structure of have a wife. Therefore 
(1979: 111), 'The missing antecedent argument ... is inapplicable, since the 
antecedent [for she] would not be rnissing, but just lexically ernpty.' 
Whatever the merits of this ana1ysis rnay be, it does not apply to (22), for 
(22) contains 'the non-null anaphor do so' (1979: 122). This makes an 
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essential difference because Wasow argues convincingly against 'a theory 
... in which non-null anaphors are themselves merely parts of !arger, 
otherwise empty structures' ( 1979: 126, n. 17). Therefore the missing-
antecedent argument still holds good. But, as the transformational 
approach to anaphora had to be abandoned, we arrive at a different 
conclusion to Grinderand Postal's from ten years ago. The consequence 
they took to be a reductio ad absurdum of the interpretive approach 
proves to be inevitable: 'Antecedents are, in some cases at least, not 
syntactic e1ements' (see above). 
Consequently, one would have to comp1icate the anaphora theorem 
even more drastically. As argued above, one could not Iimit attention to 
formal features of the antecedent and the anaphor: both syntactic and 
semantic features of other constituents would have to be taken into 
account. Furthermore, one would have to allow for syntactic configura-
tions that contain anaphoric pronouns without antecedents. It might still 
be possible to handle the previously mentioned cases of missing antece-
dents. True enough, there are no constituents in (21) and (22) which could 
be identified as antecedents of she and they, but there are nouns that are 
Jexically identical with the heads of the 'missing antecedents'. The 
syntactic configuration in which an anaphoric interpretation of they is 
possible in (22) may be characterized by a number of statements, such as 
(1) the pronoun is preceded by a sentence coordination; (2) the first 
conjunct has an occurrence of a destroyer in object position; (3) there is no 
object in the second conjunct but there is an occurrence of the anaphoric 
phrase do so; (4) the pronoun is plural; etc. While it may not be literally 
impossible to extend a given anaphora theorem to cover cases of missing 
antecedents, it should have become obvious that this task, iffeasible at all, 
cannot be performed by any simple rule but would require a theorem of 
unattractive complexity. Perhaps, then, we are confronted with a basic 
misconception: do we need a syntactic basis for anaphora at all? Consider 
the part of (22) that precedes the occurrence of they. The semantic 
interpretation shows that two destroyers, not one, are under discussion. 
So, it is a semantic fact that the speaker may refer to these two destroyers 
a second time by means of a plura1 pronoun. 
Summing up, an approach that takes anaphora to be a syntactically 
based phenomenon should account for it by establishing anaphoric 
relations through conditions that antecedent and anaphor have to meet. 
Such an account should commit us to at least the following prediction. 
Whenever an anaphoric relation holds, there are (parts of) linguistic units 
whose status as antecedent and anaphor can be established beyond doubt. 
This prediction is hard to defend in the cases of split antecedents and 
Bach-Peters sentences and is falsified by cases of 'missing antecedents'. 
Bereitgestellt von | Institut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS) Bibliothek
Angemeldet | 193.196.8.102
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.13 11:09
Anaphora by pronouns 387 
Furthermore, there may be units which can reasonably be construed as 
antecedent and anaphor but for which even the most trivial condition for 
anaphora, viz. agreement, may be violated. Thus, there is a range of cases 
where anaphora cannot be dealt with in terms of a syntactic relation. The 
best a syntactic approach could provide is a treatment of SOME anaphoric 
relations. This would force us to posit two types of anaphoric relations, 
syntactic and nonsyntactic ones. The discussion of the interpretive 
approach to pronouns has thus taken us to a point where Wasow, in 
his discussion of the transfonnational approach, was led to brandish 
Occam's razor (cf. above). Hisargument may now also be used against 
the interpretive approach: 
It seems doubtful that the interpretivists could have intended their rules 
to account for 'nonsyntactic' anaphoric pronouns. Under these circum-
stances, one wonders why they proposed the rules at all, for they could 
have accounted for 'syntactic' anaphoric pronouns with whatever mecha-
nism they meant to use in interpreting 'nonsyntactic' anaphors. 
4. The superfluity of agreement conditions 
I have argued against any attempt to explicate anaphora on a syntactic 
basis. It may seem natural, then, to approach anaphora in purely 
semantic terms, and as early as 1972 Jackendoff proposed handling 
anaphora by applying a rule of semantic interpretation that does not rely 
on syntactic agreement. Jackendoff construes anaphora as a semantic 
relation of coreference, replacing the agreement condition by his 'consis-
tency condition' (CC): if two NPs are marked as coreferential, 'those NPs 
must in fact be able to describe the same individual' (1972: 112). However, 
what exactly are the properties whereby two NPs are 'able to describe the 
same individual'? 
Consider again features of nouns, in particular gender. Traditional 
grammars of English are, as a rule, at least compatible with the view that 
gender is a classification of words (cf. e.g. Kruisinga 1932).7 This 
possibility remains even after a syntactic gender system has been rejected; 
gender might be construed as a SEMANTIC classification of words. Every 
noun is assigned to a gender class that is nonsyntactic: the class is defined 
neither by formal features of nouns nor by their syntactic function. One 
rnight, then, explain anaphora as a relation of semantic agreement, where 
two NPs are able to describe the sameindividual if they agree with respect 
to certain semantic features. On this assumption, anaphoric pronouns in 
English, such as he, are selected in conformity with the semantic 
classification of their antecederrts, such as man [ + semantic-masculine], 
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just as a pronoun in a language like German, such as er, is, on the received 
view, selected as an anaphor to a noun like Mann [ + syntactical-
masculine] - the correct pronoun is determined by agreement. Thus, by 
interpreting the CC as a semantic-agreement condition, we would achieve 
a close parallel to languages like German, where gender, number, and 
person are syntactic categories. The approach could be extended to such 
languages by postulating that two NPs are able to describe the same 
individual only if they agree either semantically or syntactically. 
Obviously, it would still not be much help to treat the syntactic features 
of the earlier approach as semantic features of agreement. All the 
problems of syntactic approaches are reintroduced through the assump-
tion that the use of pronouns is based on a relation between antecedent 
and anaphor which is specified in terms of identity with respect to certain 
features. It might be more promising to consider the view that a 
classification like gender in English is not a classification of words. 
lnstead it is often assumed that there is a 'classification of persons and 
objects as male, female or inanimate' (Lyons 1968: 164). These classes are 
supposed to correspond to the pronouns he, she, and it, respectively. This 
is a classification of referents (reference objects), not of linguistic expres-
sions, and is therefore often called one of 'natural gender'. 8 Given such a 
classification, semantic features of pronouns need not be interpreted as 
semantic-agreement markers but may be construed as defining classes of 
referents, specifying, in this way, what a pronoun 'is able to describe' 
(e.g. [+Male]). Semantic agreement may be dispensed with in favor of a 
requirement that makes the appropriate choice of an anaphoric pronoun 
dependent on the meaning of the antecedent: an anaphoric pronoun is 
selected so that the referent of the antecedent is an element of the class of 
referents that is associated with the pronoun. Still, it appears that 
phenomena like antecedents that are 'missing' or 'not present in dis-
course' present serious problems. But since semantic features of pronouns 
are now taken to delimit a range of possible referents, we would simply 
be characterizing meanings of pronouns specifying conditions of use 
WHICH APPLY REGARDLESS OF ANY ANTECEDENTS and therefore do not have 
to mention antecedents in their formulation . 
. In fact, CQllditions that make the appropriate choice of an anaphoric 
pronoun dependent on the form or meaning - and thus a fortiori the 
existence - of an antecedent are rendered superftuous. The CC in 
particular was intended to 'explain' the inconsistency that arises if two 
NPs are marked for coreference although they cannot refer to the same 
intended referent. However, this inconsistency is predicted anyhow once 
we have a definition of coreferentiality (see Jackendoff 1972: 287) and a 
specification of what an NP, or for that matter, a pronoun, can refer to. 
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Obviously, if a pronoun's meaning determines what it can be used to refer 
to, problems with agreement do not arise. Agreement as a condition on 
the use of third-person personal pronouns can simply be dispensed with. 
However, despite the serious difficulties involved, there seems to be a 
striking argument in favor of an agreement approach, sometimes pre-
sented as follows. Take a language where pronouns are syntactically 
classified for, say, gender. Assurne a context of discourse where things, 
not persons, are under discussion. What, then, could be the guideline for 
choosing a pronoun of a particular gender if not the gender of its 
antecedent? We thus seem to be forced into accepting some agreement 
rule, putting aside annoying counterexamples as exceptions. But this 
position is NOT a necessary consequence. 
At first sight, it may seem impossible to deal with the role of formal 
features of pronouns - as opposed to semantic features - without 
involving antecedents. On close examination, it tums out that formal 
features of pronouns can be treated in analogy to semantic features. The 
crucial point is this: in the absence of antecedents, formal features of 
pronouns are still not 'inoperative'. Actually, this has not passed un-
noticed in generative grammar. Tasmowski-De Ryck and Verluyten 
(1981) point out that pronouns without antecedent that are 'generally 
considered to be pragmatically controlled . . . are in fact sensitive to 
aspects of linguistic form' (1981: 153); cf. their examp1es:9 
(23) (John wants his pants that are on a chair and he says to Mary:) 
Could you hand {~h~tm} to me, please? 
(24) (Same situation, but this time John wants his shirt:) 
Could you hand {~t them} to me, please? 
And from French: 
(25) (John is trying to pack a large table [Ia table, feminine] into the 
trunk of his car. Mary says:) 
Tu n'arriveras jamais ä {~\e} faire entrer dans ta voiture . 
. 11 {it (fern.) } . 'You w1 never manage to get . mto your car.' 1t (masc.) 
(26) (Same situation, but with a desk [le bureau, masculine]. Mary says:) 
Tu n'arriveras jamais ä {~e la} faire entrer dans ta voiture. 
. {it (masc.)} . 
'You will never manage to get . fi mto your car.' 1t ( em.) 
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They comment that 'the real-world objects pants and shirt do not have 
anything inherently singular or plural in them' just as 'the real-world 
objects table and desk are neither masculine nor feminine' (1981: 153). 
Rather, 'choice of the [appropriate] form of the anaphoric pronoun is 
affected by the linguistic antecedents: the English words pants (plural) and 
shirt (singular)' (1981: 154), similarly for the French words Ia table 
(feminine) and le bureau (masculine). They 'therefore conclude that 
linguistic factors play a roJe in all anaphora .... Some kind of pragmatic 
recoverability condition should be introduced to ensure that the linguistic 
antecedent can be inferred from the pragmatic context' (1981: 154). 
The facts illustrated by (23) to (26) are unequivocal. Any number of 
examples could be constructed from any language that has formal, 
nonsemantic features of pronouns: formal features of pronouns are 
pertinent to the use of pronouns without antecedents (cf. also [44] below). 
On the other hand, Tasmowski-De Ryck and Verluyten interpret these 
facts in a way that is definitely misleading, despite its preliminary form. It 
hardly makes sense to speak of 'the linguistic antecedent' of a pronoun 
that is characterized as not having one. There seems to be a tacit 
assumption by the authors that the formal features of any pronoun are 
controlled by an antecedent. Thus, if formal features are operative, there 
must be one. Pronouns without antecedents are thus forced into the mold 
of an apparently standard case by establishing a vague parallel in terms of 
recoverability. 
I shall take the opposite line. No reference to antecedents is necessary 
to account for the examples (23) to (26): instead, we can simply rely on 
our knowledge of the lexicon of the language. To understand them in (23) 
as a reference to John's pants, we must know that there is a plural noun in 
English, viz. pants, tha:t may be used to refer to pants. Similarly, le in 
French is masculine and can therefore be used in connection with any 
referent that can be referred to by some masculine noun in French. 
Formal features and semantic features of pronouns, such as [ + Mascu-
line] of le in French and [+Male] of he in English, turn out to have 
essentially the same function: they delimit the range of what the pronoun 
'is able to describe'. A pronoun marked [ + Masculine] requires a corre-
sponding antecedent as little as a pronoun marked [+Male] requires an 
antecedent marked [+Male]. The roJe of semantic-pronoun features can 
be and must be described without mentioning antecedents and this holds 
for formal features, too. Given a formal feature, a pronoun may be used 
to refer to some object if the pronoun formally conforms to some noun 
that COULD be used to refer to that object. Thus formal features establish 
a relation between pronoun occurrences and items in the lexicon (which 
may or may not occur in the pronoun's context). 
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5. Lexical meanings of pronouns 
Now Iet us take a somewhat closer Iook at the roJe played by semantic 
and syntactic fea1tures in the use of pronouns, again concentrating on 
gender. I shall consider semantic features first. It is by no means clear that 
a 'natural gender' classification can be established in biological terms, say, 
by reference to sex organs. 10 Leaving aside personifications of sexless 
things, typical of fairy tales, she may be used to refer to ships, countries, 
towns, '(especially by men) to lovingly handled objects' (Weinreich 1966: 
405) or even (within homosexual circles) to male persans playing a female 
role. It may be used to refer to animals and babies or, as a pejorative, to 
any person. One may also use he or she to refer to certain animals without 
committing oneself to any assumption about their sex. Thus, use of 
personal pronouns in English is based on a classification of referents that 
is not correctly characterized as male vs. female vs. inanimate. lt would be 
misleading to speak of 'natural gender' without the proviso that natural 
gender and sex must not be equated (cf. Kruisinga 1932). 
To account for the use of she, we want a description of what it means 
for some object tobe 'womanly' with respect to (a speaker of some variety 
of) English. A basic criterion for classifying pronoun referents for English 
is something like 'having personality'. lt should provide us with two 
classes, one corresponding to he and she, the other to it. This criterion 
differs from [±Animate]; it allows for animate (living) beings treated as 
lacking personality (e.g. animals referred to by it), and also allows for 
inanimate things treated as having personality (e.g. a favorite car referred 
to by she). 'Animated' would be more appropriate than 'animate' to 
indicate the hejshe domain. This domain is then subdivided in terms of 
'manly' vs. 'womanly'. Typical candidates for classification as manly or 
womanly are creatures of male or female sex, but other properties such as 
social roles may be decisive. In the case of animals, the crucial question 
may be whether the SPECIES belongs to a male or female TYPE rather than 
the question whether an individual belongs to the male or female SEX: 
referring to a cat by she does not automatically entail that the cat is 
assumed to be female- A cat would eat jish, but would not wet her feet. Not 
only in story telling is he used to refer to big, male-type animals and she to 
small, female-type ones. When males and females of a single species are 
denoted by different words, the distinction between the marked term and 
the generic term may provide a cue. 
As a matter of fact, 'manly' is not a very fortunate term for describing 
the referents of he, since he is often used generically.U 'Womanly' must 
also be understood to apply to inanimate objects which are conceived as 
animated but do not, of course, have sex. lt is worth repeating that 
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different pronouns may be used to refer to a single referent. A baby may 
be treated as not yet having personality and referred to by it; if the baby's 
name and sex are known, it may be a referent of he or she. Similarly, a 
speaker may refer to a car by either it or she depending on how he feels 
about it12 (for a collection of examples see Kruisinga 1932). It is not 
always properties of objects which are specifiable in biological or other 
scientific terms that commit a speaker to make use of a certain pronoun. 
The use of pronouns is controlled by the intention of the speaker to assign 
certain attributes. In other words, we do not need an improved objective 
classification of referents, but a specification of pronoun meanings. I shall 
assume that word meanings are concepts (Lieb 1979, 1980b), and 
tentatively posit 13 ·manly·, ·womanly·, and ·nonpersonar as meanings of 
he, she and it, respectively. 14 (I will not enter into a specification of these 
concepts; this would require a specialized study of English, cf. e.g. 
Kruisinga 1932; Quirk and Greenbaum 1973.) 
Characterizing pronouns in terms of an objective classification of 
referents would be futile for two reasons. First, such an attempt overlooks 
the fact that for pronouns, too, meaning and extension must be distin-
guished (see also Lieb 1983). A classification of referents of pronouns 
does not yield clear-cut classes. This raises difficulties for an 'objective-
classification approach' but may be assigned to a general feature of 
naturallanguage, vagueness of word meanings. Second, rather than being 
based on 'objective' categories, the semantics of hefshefit reflects human 
behavior in specific societies. The perspective is centered on man (in either 
sense of the word). Speaking metaphorically, the world is represented by 
three concentric circles. The human male is right in the middle, the 
paramount case of an 'animated' creature. Around him there is every-
thing closely tied to male interest: women, countries, and cars, in 
particular. Left on the outside there is the rest: not 'animated', lacking 
personality. 15 It is, so to speak, built into the language as a tacit 
assumption that men talk among themselves about what they themselves 
are doing. 'Lovingly handled objects' are therefore womanly, and he may 
be used in a generic sense (see also Stanley 1977). 
There are two factors that control the use of pronouns. So far I have 
sketched the first factor, viz. conceptual meaning. The second factor 
consists of correspondences between lexical items. Let me reserve the term 
'agreement' for syntagmatic relations between constituents of syntactic 
units. We may say that a pronoun CONFORMS to nouns ofthe samegender 
or, more generally, that a pronoun has a certain ASSOCIATIVE POTENTIAL 
due to formal lexical associations. Associative potential of a pronoun is 
comparable to conceptual meaning: it delimits the associated extension. 
Thus one may ask whether the associative potential of a pronoun IS (one 
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of) its meaning(s). Meanings of this type would be distinguished by 
involving a reference to a Ianguage system in a sense that has been 
discussed by Roman Jakobson. Jakobson (1957: 130) classifies the ways in 
which 'the general meaning of a code unit may imply reference (renvoi) to 
the code or to the message'. To exemplify the case of 'code referring to 
code (C/C)', he used proper names (1957: 131): 
The general meaning of a proper name cannot be defined without a reference to 
the code. In the code of English, 'Jerry' means a person named Jerry. The 
circularity is obvious: the name means anyone to whom this name is assigned. 
Recently, Lieb, pursuing the same idea, proposed to assume conceptual 
meanings for proper names. For Jakobson's example the concept would 
be "Jerry· (cf. Lieb 1981: 552): 
· Jerry" = the concept whose intension is the set (Je) where Je= df the 
property of being an x such that x is called Jerry in S (a certain 
idiolect). 
As stressed by Lieb, the intension of such a concept is 'Ianguage 
dependent (involves a property that presupposes a system of a certain 
Ianguage variety or an idiolect)' ( 1981: 553). 
Third-person personal pronouns can be subsumed under category C/C, 
too. As for German, Lieb (1983) suggests meanings such as ·masc(S)" for 
er. The extension of this concept is the set of entities which are in the 
extensions associated with masculine substantives in S, a certain idiolect 
system. Thus, associative potential of personal pronouns can be recon-
structed by assuming word meanings that involve 'a reference to the 
code'. This does not imply, however, that associative potential can always 
be reconstructed via word meanings. Lieb assumes that the concepts 
·masc(S)", ·rem(S)", and ·neutr(S)" not only occur with personal pronouns 
but are also involved in the construction of meanings for units such as 
Alte mag ich nicht '(lit.:) old [fern.] like I not' (uttered after, say, Wirf die 
Butter weg '(lit.:) throw the butter [fern.] away'). Alte, by virtue of its 
feminine gender, is appropriate for referring to entities in the extension of 
"fem(S)". But ifwe were to make this part ofits meaning we would have to 
posit different meanings for what are just differently inflected forms of one 
and the same adjectivallexeme, viz. alter [masc.], alte [fern.], altes [neut.]. 
If we assume that word meanings are to be assigned to Iexemes, not to 
forms of Iexemes, it follows that associative potential cannot always be 
handled in terms of word meanings. Instead, we may state that every 
nominal which does not have a substantival head has an associative 
potential. However, as long as we restriet our attention to personal 
Bereitgestellt von | Institut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS) Bibliothek
Angemeldet | 193.196.8.102
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.13 11:09
394 B. Wiese 
pronouns we can leave things where they are since pronouns such as er, 
sie, es are in fact different Iexemes. 
To some extent, these factors - associative potential and conceptual 
meaning - are applied alternatively, different languages opting for 
different sides. Thus, German and French exhibit a grammatical gender 
system, whereas English provides gender specification through pronoun 
meanings. Even in the former languages pronouns have conceptual 
meanings and are used according to these (cf. also Cooper 1975: 66f.). As 
was illustrated in (15) and (16), a girl may be referred to in German by es 
[neut.] 'it', due to existence of the word Mädchen [neut.] 'girl'; or eise by 
sie [fern.] 'she', due to the fact that a girl is female. 
One might object that conceptual meanings such as "womanly" are 
superftuous for German pronouns (Lieb 1983 only mentions "fem(S)" as a 
meaning of sie). We could also try to explain the use of sie in (16) by 
taking recourse to its associative potential: there are feminine words for 
referring to girls in German. However, such words are rare. Furthermore, 
we should account for the following fact: if the occurrence of das 
Mädchen is near to the pronoun, es is preferred, while ifit is more distant, 
sie is more likely. 16 This is easily explained ifwe assume that sie has both 
an associative potential (or a meaning dependent on a language system, 
for that matter) and a conceptual meaning (of a usual type). As is weil 
known, under normal circumstances, the form of an utterance is sooner 
forgotten than its meaning. Therefore if the occurrence of das Mädchen is 
more distant, there is reason to believe that the hearer may only remernher 
that a girl, a female person, is under discussion. Accordingly, the use of sie 
is more suitable (cf. also note 26). 
Martinet (1962) has noted for French that 'eile is sometimes used in 
reference to females who, in the same context, have been designated by 
means of a masculine noun' (1962: 18): 
(27) Le docteur est arrive; elle est dans Je salon. 
'The doctor [masculine] has arrived; she [feminine] is in the living-
room'. 
Here again we find that choice of the pronoun is not controlled by formal 
features of its antecedent. Elle is used to refer to a female physician, which 
brings in conceptual meaning. Such examples (cf. also Lyons 1968: 286) 
nicely illustrate the difference between syntactic agreement and corre-
spondence between antecedent and anaphor. A word like docteur, which 
is masculine, or for that matter, not marked as feminine, i.e. nonfeminine, 
may be used to refer to male as weil as female physicians. An interpreta-
tion of (27) where docteur and elle refer to the same person is in keeping 
with their respective meanings. For syntactic agreement it is the categori-
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zation of docteur as nonfeminine that must be taken into account. (28) is 
ungrammatical: 
(28) Le nouveau docteur est belle. 
'The new doctor [nonfeminine] is good-looking [feminine].' 
But (29) is correct: 
(29) Elle est belle, Je nouveau docteur. 
'She [fern.] is good-looking [fern.], the new doctor [nonfem.].' 
Such examples motivate the following assumption: agreement is a 
syntactic condition whose violation results in syntactically deviant sen-
tences. In contradistinction, nonconformity of a pronoun with a poten-
tial antecedent does not entail syntactic deviance; nonconformity may, 
but need not, exclude certain interpretations of a sentence in which it 
obtains. Agreement, then, is no condition on anaphora. 17 In English too, 
some use is made of formal lexical correspondences, as in (23) vs. (24), 
where a pronoun of the appropriate number is selected through know-
ledge of the lexicon. As exemplified by German, French, and English, 
both conceptual meaning and associative potential can be exploited in a 
single language while the relative importance of these factors differs 
between languages. 
6. Pronouns and speaker reference 
I have argued that agreement phenomena do not necessitate a relational 
approach to anaphora. Instead I have supported the demand for a 
uniform treatment of pronoun occurrences that happen to have antece-
dents and those that have none (a requirement also made by Stenning 
1975 and 1978). Where pronouns are used to refer to entities that may, or 
may not, have been referred to in the linguistic cotext, there is no difficulty 
in conceiving such a theory, once suitable pronoun meanings are provided 
for: pronouns turn out to be rather normal definite nominals, as already 
suggested by Stenning (1975, 1978) and Lieb (1979: 376). Things are 
different if pronoun occurrences are considered where the pronouns 
appear not to be used for referring at all. This is the case, as has been 
repeatedly suggested in the literature, if a pronoun has as its antecedent a 
so-called quantifier expression. If quantifier expressions do not have 
reference, as has been argued in particular by Geach (1962), an anaphori-
cally used pronoun cannot play what was traditionally considered to be 
its role, viz. 'picking up the antecedent's reference'; in consequence, 
neither could the pronoun itself be said to have reference. Thus it may 
Bereitgestellt von | Institut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS) Bibliothek
Angemeldet | 193.196.8.102
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.13 11:09
396 B. Wiese 
seem that to account for such pronoun occurrences it is still necessary to 
have a grammatical antecedent-anaphor relation of some kind. 
Unfortunately the term 'reference' is often used 'rather sloppily' by 
linguists (as admitted by Wasow 1979: 32 n. I, who offers the dubious 
excuse that this 'is in keeping with the general practice of linguists'). 
Confusion is created especially if the distinction between semantic 
reference or denotation (what an expression 'is able to describe') and 
speaker reference (what a speaker refers to) is not properly drawn. I have 
no space here to enter into philosophical debates but will simply assume 
the validity of an account (following Strawson 1950; Linsky 1967; and 
others; cf. Lyons 1977: § 7.2) by which it is speakers who refer by means of 
linguistic expressions. As an abbreviation we may then say that an 
occurrence of an expression refers to what the speaker is referring to in 
using the expression. In contradistinction, an expression may be said to be 
connected through its meaning to the extension of a concept, i.e. the set of 
entities to which the concept applies. 
Now consider (30). 
(30) John has a donkey. He beats it every day. 
lohn may be taken to denote a certain individual, but a donkey cannot. He 
may be used to refer to John, but what about it? Obviously, a speaker 
uttering (30) may use it to refer to that donkey he was talking about when 
using the phrase a donkey. There is also no obstacle in the way of saying 
that the speaker referred to some donkey by a donkey if a pragmatic 
notion of reference is accepted. What we must not say isthat a donkey and 
it are coreferential expressions where it is assumed (as it has been by many 
linguists) that 'coreference is an exclusively semantic property' (Jack-
endoff 1972: 111). 
While theories of semantic coreference are not applicable to quanti-
fier-pronoun pairs, some authors have made proposals which in effect 
assimilate the treatment of (at least some) such pronoun occurrences to 
what appears to be the standard case of coreference theories, viz. pairs of 
referential definite antecedents and referential definite anaphors (cf. 
Lasnik 1976: 15 n. 9; 'minimally if two NPs are coreferential they must 
both be referential'). As far as pronoun occurrences like it in (30) are 
concerned, the idea advanced by Stenning (cf. his identification relation, 
1978: 174) and Evans (cf. his E-type pronouns, 1977, 1980) is basically 
this: if there is no definite antecedent the reference of which the pronoun 
can pick up, one has 'to construct from the sentence containing the 
antecedent quantifier a description which is to fix the reference of the E-
type pronoun' (1977: 535). The result of the construction ('the donkey 
John has') is characterized as follows (1977: 499): 'Roughly, the pronoun 
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denotes those objects which verify (or that object which verifies) the 
sentence containing the quantifier antecedent.' Such an antecedent con-
struction becomes necessary if one wants to reject 'the inadequate 
pragmatic relation of reference' (Stenning 1978: 174)18 and to sustain the 
basic conviction of coreference theories: pronouns are given an interpreta-
tion on the basis of a relation between linguistic expressions (though the 
antecedents might not always be explicitly given NPs); by construing 
anaphora as a relation between expressions, any recourse to speaker 
intentions is to be avoided. Tobe successful, then, such an approach has 
to predict that the reference-fixing descriptions are indeed constructible 
exclusively in semantic terms. However, Evans hirnself notices (1977: 517) 
that the semantic content of the antecedent clause may not be sufficient: 
'We should allow the reference ofthe E-type pronoun tobe fixed not only 
by predicative material explicitly in the antecedent clause, but also by 
material which the speaker supplies upon demand.' Furthermore, in a 
dialogue such as (31) "'fixing the reference" of an E-type pronoun can 
involve cancellation of explicit predicative material in the antecedent' 
(1977: 517): 
(31) A: A man jumped out of the crowd and fell in front of the horses. 
B: He didn't jump. He was pushed. 
Thus for two complementary reasons, there is no mechanical procedure 
for arriving at a reconstructed definite description. If one were to explicate 
the interpretation of some E-type pronoun occurrence by some hearer in 
termsofadefinite description, one would have to use every relevant piece 
of information. The information provided by the antecedent clause is just 
one clue for reconstructing what the speaker was talking about. Evans 
quite correctly states 'the requirement for the appropriate use of an E-
type pronoun in terms of having answered or being prepared to answer 
upon demand, the question "He? Who?" or "lt? Which?"' (1977: 516 f). 19 
That is, the court of the last resort that decides what a pronoun 
occurrence is used to refer to is the speaker who uses it. For pronouns this 
is no less true than for definite nominals in general. 
lt is well known that referents of a definite noun phrase occurrence 
cannot be established simply on the basis of the extension of any concept 
associated with the noun phrase. First, not every conceivable object in the 
extension may figure as a referent, but only objects that are 'under 
discussion'. Second, the referents of an NP may not be in the extensi<m of 
any relevant concept. If a definite noun phrase is used referentially (as 
opposed to attributively, see Donnellan 1966; Lieb 1979), it is sufficient 
that the speaker should BELIEVE the referents to be in the extension (cf. 
also Lyons 1977: 182). What a speaker can refer to successfully by means 
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of an NP may or may not be the corresponding semantic referent (if there 
is one). This was overlooked for a long time by logically minded 
investigators of language but could not .escape the notice of those who 
had to assess real-life language use: as any student of law will teil you, 
falsa demonstratio non nocet. 
As far as pronouns are concerned, this means that the coreference-of-
expressions approach fails even where anteceding definite descriptions do 
exist. It has been convincingly argued by Donnellan (1978) that a 
pronoun anaphorically linked to an antecedent is ordinarily used to pick 
up speaker reference. Donnellan (1978: 65) adduces dialogues like 
(32)-(33): 
(32) The guy in the English department who has been getting chummy 
with the dean has just gotten promoted to full professor. Shows 
what things are coming to. 
(33) You are wrong about him. I've investigated and he is far from 
chummy with the dean - in fact they had a quarrel just last week. 
In uttering (33), speaker B uses the pronouns to talk about the man whom 
speaker A referred to in (32) by the noun phrase the guy in the English 
department who has been getting chummy with the dean. 
lt is commonplace to regard 'repetition as the core of anaphora' 
(Stenning 1978: 165). Wasow's characterization (1979: 1) of the notion 
'anaphoric re1ationship' is just one example: 'When two items A and B in 
a given discourse are anaphorically related, the full specification of the 
meaning of B involves (i) referring to the fact that A and B are 
anaphorically related, and (ii) repeating some part of the meaning of A.' 
Try and apply this to (32)-(33). Neither does the pronoun 'repeat some 
part of the meaning of the NP' nor has the pronoun been used to refer to 
the semantic referent, if any, of the NP: speaker B denies that the man can 
be described by the NP. Anaphoric use of him in (33) is compatible with 
the fact that the alleged antecedent-NP is, for the speaker, not 'able to 
describe' the individual he is referring to by him (see also Kripke 1977: 
270). 
Quite generally, pronouns are not used to pick up the semantic 
referents of anteceding expressions but are used to refer to referents that 
figurein the given situation-specific universe-of-discourse (in the sense of 
Lyons 1977: §§ 12.7, 15.3). In the above example, the referent is available 
at the time of speaker B's utterance because it was previously referred to 
by speaker A. True enough, speaker A is mistaken in believing that the 
referent is in the extension associated with his NP. Speaker B may still 
rely on other information in picking up the referent by a pronoun, such as 
the proposition of (32), his knowledge of the prejudices of A, etc. 
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The coreference theory has been questioned by linguists and logicians 
on account of nonreferential antecedents. What has not been challenged 
is the assumption that pairs consisting of a referential antecedent and a 
referential anaphor are the standard case and thus confirm the corefer-
ence theory. However, it is precisely in the case of referential antecedents 
that speaker intentions appear to be crucial in determining the antece-
dent's referent. Interestingly enough, Lasnik also notes ( 1976: 6 n. 5) that 
'it is possible that the notion of coreference ... should be replaced with 
that of intended coreference'. But, coreference then ceases to be an 
'internal-language' relation, and we can no Ionger 'maintain that the 
problern of coreference with a discourse is a linguistic problern and can be 
studied independently of any general theory of extralinguistic reference' 
(Karttunen 1976: 366). 
7. 'Bound-variable pronouns' 
Some pronoun occurrences have been described in the Iiterature as 
analogues to bound variables in logic. Consider (34): 
(34) Every man loves his mother. 
(35) John loves his mother. 
According to one interpretation, (34) says that for every man x, x Ioves 
x's mother. Comparing (34) and (35), Evans has stressed that we cannot 
be content with giving 'utterly unconnected explanations of the roJe of the 
pronouns' ( 1980: 345), for example by supplementing a pragmatic 
approach with an extra device that is to account for 'bound-variable 
pronouns' (as done, among others, by Lasnik 1976). lnstead, Evans 
suggests, one should try again and assimilate such pronoun uses to the 
alleged standard case, viz. coreference. This can be done if quantified 
sentences like (34) receive a substitutional interpretation: the quantifier 
expression is replaced by singular terms, viz. names (say 'ßt', 'ß2' ... ) of 
those entities that satisfy the common noun that restricts the quantifier (in 
this case, names of men). So the interpretation of (34) in a sense reduces to 




ß 1 loves his mother 
ß2 loves his mother 
If his in an utterance of (34) is used 'as a device for registering coreference' 
(Evans 1980: 347) the thus-established antecedent-anaphor relation car-
ries over to the (36) sentences, andin consequence (34) is true iff ßt loves 
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ßt 's mother, ß2 /oves ß2 's mother, etc. is true. On the other hand hisinan 
utterance of (34) may be used 'as a device for making an independent 
reference to some salient object' (1980: 347), say, Jack. In this case, the 
occurrences in the substitution instances must also be assumed to refer to 
Jack. Thus there are two readings of (34), which, by Evans's approach, 
are based on two ways of interpreting the pronoun, viz. as a coreference 
device and as an independent-reference device, respectively. 
A pragmatic approach on the other hand, Evans claims, can provide 
only the second reading. lt is true, facts about the context of an utterance 
of (34) can be used to identify some salient object as the intended referent 
of his, but 'there is no way these facts can determine a different referent 
for the pronoun in each Substitution instance' (Evans 1980: 351) as would 
be required for the 'bound-variable interpretation'. We would have to 
ensure that his in (36i) refers to ßt, his in (36ii) refers to ß2, etc. -
antecedents and pronouns pairing off. To accomplish this, Evans thinks, 
we need a coreference rule. But Evans's demonstration for the necessity of 
coreference-pronouns is not conclusive. He asserts that 'the only property 
of a pragmatic explanation of coreference on which [he] need[s] to rely' 
(1980: 351) is the fact that such an approach is bound to assume 
... that it does not make any sense to enquire into the truth value of the sentence 
John loves his mother considered independently of any particular context of 
utterance; this is so even when the interpretation ofthe expressions 'John', 'loves', 
and 'mother' are given (1980: 350 f.). 
This claim is, at the least, misleadingly put. It is indeed uncontroversial 
that one has to rely on contextual information in finding out what his in 
the sentence quoted could be used to refer to. This must be and is in fact a 
feature of Evans's own approach, too (a pronoun would not teil us if it is 
used as a 'coreference device' or not)20! While one need not know a 
particular context, one has to suppose knowledge of certain properties of 
the assumed context. Moreover, what one is really bound to assume is 
that it does not make any sense to enquire into the reference of a pronoun 
occurrence if nothing at all is known about its context-of-utterance 
(whereas one can enquire into the extension connected to the pronoun's 
meaning). But in the circumstances described we do know part of the 
context, viz. the intrasentential cotext. (It would be, of course, tautologi-
cal to exclude the intrasentential cotext from the context relevant for 
reference fixing and to assert on this basis that 'intrasentential corefer-
ence' must be rule-governed.) In particular, we are supposed to know 'the 
interpretation of the expression "John"'. Thus for any utterance of (35) 
we may assume an intended referent of John that may be picked up by his. 
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By analogy, if we accept an interpretation of (34) in terms of its 
substitution instances, we can assume that his in (36i) may be taken to 
refer to ß1 , etco Actually, this is not controversial. The point is rather, how 
do we know when building up the bound-variable interpretation that the 
antecedent's referent is the only possible referent for his? 
By Evans's own assumption, the first step in the interpretation of (34) is 
to decide whether the pronoun is used to refer to some 'salient object' 
given in advanceo Suppose we decide there is no such referent. From this it 
does NOT follow that the pronoun then must receive its interpretation as 
the result of some semantic rule as opposed to consideration of the 
context. Rather the pronoun may still become associated with a referent 
that is made available in the context but not until a later stage of 
interpreting the sentence is reachedo If we come to interpreting (36i), we 
know that ß1 is a possible referent for his, and, remembering our initial 
assumption, we know that no other referentwas available; thus we know 
that ßt is the only possible referent for his in (36i); analogously for the 
other substitution instanceso 
In order to show that a coreference rule is really not needed we might 
incorporate these suggestions into a formal semanticso This could be done 
in a natural way within Hintikka's game-theoretical semantics (GTS; see 
Saarinen 1979b)o Agame G(S) correlated with a sentence S represents an 
attempt of a player called Myself to verify S, while the opponent player 
called Nature tries to thwart Myselfs strategyo Complex sentences, eogo 
quantified sentences, are reduced to atomic sentences in the course oftheir 
correlated gameso If the resulting atomic sentence is true, Myself has wono 
The initial sentence S is true iff Myself has a winning strategyo With 
respect to quantifier expressions it is assumed that 'in any actual round of 
this game G(S) 0 0 0 the quantifier phrases of S are replaced by proper 
names of individuals chosen one by one by the one or the other of the two 
players' (Hintikka 1979a: 32)0 If a some phrase is tobe replaced, Myself 
has the choice; in the case of an every phrase Nature chooseso Pronouns, 
too, are to be replaced by nameso 
Where do we get the names replacing the pronouns from? According to 
the received view where anaphora is construed as a syntactic-semantic 
antecedent-anaphor relation, we should Iook at the pronoun's antece-
dent. The antecedent, of course, might not be a name, but if it is not, it 
will be replaced by one in the course of the garneo Thus if there is an 
antecedent, there will also be a name that can be substituted in place of 
the pronouno But this would mean that in GTS, too, one needs a 
grammatical mechanism for relating pronouns to antecedentso In fact, 
according to Saarinen it is 'customary' in GTS to assume that 'the 
antecedent is determined by syntactical considerations' (1979a: 289), 
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though Hintikka and Carlson (1979: 195) have rejected 'approaches to 
anaphora where the main weight is put on antecedence relations'. Since 
'considering grammatical (syntactical) relations of antecedence on1y' 
(1979: 95) is not sufficient to explain pronominal anaphora, they conclude 
that in the standard case, pronouns 'serve to recover a reference to an 
individual which has somehow been introduced earlier' (1979: 212). Thus 
the game rule effecting the replacement of a pronoun by a name should 
not presuppose the identification of a linguistic antecedent within the 
original sentence. (Hintikka and Carlson discuss Karttunen's sentence 
quoted as [7] above as exemplifying one situation where this would in fact 
not be possible.) Instead the rule has to relate the pronoun to an 
individual which has been introduced earlier in the text. Hintikka's 
proposal for dealing with anaphorically used pronouns (or the phrases, 
forthat matter) is to require them- or to allow them (cf. Hintikka and 
Saarinen 1979: 157) - 'to be replaced by a proper name as soon as their 
antecedent is replaced by this proper name' (Hintikka 1979b: 86). 
Adapting this idea to our ends we may require that a singular pronoun is 
to be replaced by a proper name of some individual a either as soon as a is 
made available or not at all. 21 
Consider some game (or subgame) G(S). As soon as some quantifier 
expression is replaced by a name, this makes available a discourse referent 
that might become associated with some pronoun in S. The pronoun may 
get replaced by a name of that referent. If the pronoun is not replaced, 
this chance for giving it a referent is, as it were, missed. The pronoun 
cannot be assigned a reference until another referent crops up. For 
pronouns that are used to refer to referents not made available within a 
game G(S), it seems natural to assume that their referents must be 
available at the very beginning of the game. Thus such pronoun occur-
rences are to be replaced as soon as the game starts. Consider now what 
game is to be correlated with (34). The game may start with Myself 
substituting a name ofsome individual ofthe appropriate sort (depending 
on the meaning ofthe pronoun) for his, say John. (This represents the type 
ofuse where some individual is already available as a referent of his, since 
it has for example been identified by an accompanying gesture.) The game 
is continued with respect to Every man loves John's mother. Now Nature 
may choose any man's name as a substitute for every man. IfNature does 
not succeed in finding a man suchthat he does not Iove John's mother, 
Myself has won. On the other band, Myself may not utilize the chance of 
replacing his right at the beginning. (This represents a situation where 
there is no suitable referent available before the processing ofthe sentence 
begins.) Nature may replace every man by, say again, John. This move will 
make John available as a referent for his. John is now also the only 
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referent available, since Myself has waived to choose another in tbe first 
place. (A pronoun has tobe replaced 'as soon as possible'.) Tbus wben 
encountering lohn loves his mother at tbis stage of tbe game, Myself is to 
cboose Jobn as tbe referent of his. Since Nature may present Myself witb 
an arbitrarily cbosen individual of tbe appropriate sort, in tbese circum-
stances Myself bas a winning strategy only if every man loves bis own 
mother. 
I bave sketcbed bow to arrive at tbe two interpretations of (34) in a 
game-tbeoretical semantics. No extra mecbanism for 'bound-variable 
pronouns' is required. 22 Pronouns are always interpreted by relating tbem 
to individuals that have become available somebow. Instead, the ambigu-
ity of (34) is explained in terms of different orders in wbich tbe game rules 
for quantifiers and pronouns are applied. In fact, it is a cbaracteristic 
feature of GTS to allow for different orders of applying game rules and to 
explain certain ambiguities from this vantage point. 
In this section I bave used tbe framework of GTS;23 for tbe sake of tbe 
argument, I bave adopted tbe view that anapbora can and sbould be 
construed as a purely semantic pbenomenon. Even so, a treatment of 
'bound-variable pronouns' can be given that does not rely on a grammati-
cal antecedent-anapbor relation. But tbis is not meant to imply that a 
purely semantic approacb to pronominal anapbora can be accepted as 
fully satisfactory. The arguments advanced in tbe preceding section to tbe 
effect tbat pronouns are ordinarily used to pick up speaker referents still 
stand and can be applied again. Consider (37) and (38) from Smaby 
(1979: 37 f.): 
(37) Jobn invited Bill and Sam and George to a party at bis bouse. 
Everyone had a good time. 
(38) Jobn invited Bill and Sam and George to a party at bis bouse. 
Everyone arrived before eigbt o'clock. 
Speaking in GTS terms, whicb names could be substituted for everyone in 
(34) and (35), respectively? Trivially, the fact tbat an expression like 
everyone can be used in talking about eacb and every person sbould n<,>t 
permit tbe substitution of eacb and every name when an occ.urrence of 
everyone in a particular text is considered: not everyone in the world is 
under discussion. More importantly, restricting the domain of the 
quantifier to tbe objects that have been antecedently mentiqned does not 
suffice. Presumably, John is not a good candidate. as a substitute for 
everyone in (38) but migbt be in (37). This difference arises although tbe 
preceding context is the saine for bo.th quantifier occurrences. Thus there 
cannot be a semantic rule that determines the quantifier's domain from 
the 'antecedent text'. A speaker uttering (37) or (38) may still be confident 
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that his addressee may understand which persons he intends tobe under 
discussion in using the quantifier expression. One thing he may rely on is 
the proposition of the quantified sentence, but, clearly, command of 
grammar rules will not suffice for a full understanding of texts like (37) 
and (38); common sense is required. As noted by Hintikka and Carlson 
'collateral evidence' (1979: 195) may be crucial in pronoun interpretation 
and when this is so their 'explanation, when fully worked out, is a 
pragmatical rather than semantic one' (1979: 195). It appears that speaker 
intentions are an unavoidable factor in the interpretation of quantifier 
expressions. A fortiori, the semantic properties of a quantifier alone 
cannot suffice to determine the interpretation of a pronoun it 'binds'. 
There is no need for an intralinguistic coreference-of-expressions rule, if 
pronouns, including 'bound-variable pronouns', are seen as picking up 
referents that are contextually available. Since the linguistic cotext is part 
of the overall context, this idea can be formalized within a semantic 
approach with some success. But surely it constitutes the core of what has 
been called a pragmatic approach and can be made fully general only if 
one accepts a psychologically realistic view of referring. While a quantifier 
expression does not have a semantic reference, it can be used in referring 
(by a speaker). A speaker may introduce a referent by means of phrases 
such as a donkey. Hence he may subsequently refer to the referent thus 
introduced by a pronoun. By every man in (34) the speaker may refer to 
arbitrary men he takes to be under discussion (cf. Lieb 1980a); in 
addition, he commits hirnself to defend the proposition of the sentence 
with respect to each of these; that is, he has to defend at least as much as 
he would have to defend if he bad referred to an arbitrarily chosen 
particular one referent; in a sense, he is in the same position he would 
have been in if he bad referred to that referent. This resembles modal 
contexts (cf. Hintikka and Carlson 1979: 212 f.); for instance, a speaker 
who has instructed bis addressee to counterfactually assume the existence 
of some object may refer to this object as if it does exist. This 'quasi-
referent' is available as long as the 'modal game' is played; if the game is 
concluded, the referent is cancelled. Similarly, playing the 'every game', 
the speaker may use a pronoun as ifhe bad referred to a certain individual 
by means of the quantifier expression. 24 After the game is concluded this 
option will no Ionger be available; but when the speaker used the every 
phrase to refer to a multiplicity, he may still refer to these referents by a 
plural pronoun. That is why 'universally quantified singular NP's (e.g. 
everyone) can often control the reference of plural pronouns when they 
fail to bind a singular pronoun, and plural quantified NP's can always do 
so' (Reinhart 1983: 83). 
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8. Anaphoric use of definite nominals 
In the preceding I have examined a number of attempts to explain 
anaphora in terms of a syntactic and/or semantic relation between 
anaphors and antecedents. Before finally tuming to the question of what 
it means for a pronoun tobe used anaphorically, Jet me sum up what has 
been said in evaluating such approaches. According to the strongest 
version of the relational approach, a pronoun is nothing but a syntactic 
dummy for an antecedent, which does away with any need for a semantics 
of pronouns. This was clearly inadequate. A weaker version proposes that 
pronouns are interpreted on the basis of a syntactic relation, in particular 
an agreement relation. However, examples of nonagreement, missing 
antecedents, split antecedents, and the like all involve cases where it does 
not seem plausible to construe anaphora as a syntactically based phenom-
enon. A semantic approach that simply replaces syntactic agreement by 
semantic agreement does not overcome these problems. Another version 
of a semantic-agreement approach that tries to explain the use of 
pronouns in terms of an objective classification of antecedents' referents 
has to be rejected, too. Even where there is an antecedent, it is wrong to 
assume that the choice of a pronoun is an automatic consequence of the 
objective nature of the referent. Speakers of English are generally free to 
choose the pronoun that best serves their communicative intentions. That 
is, pronouns are used according to their meanings. No doubt, there are 
languages where formal features are crucial for the use of pronouns. 
These features are also operative with pronouns that do not have 
antecedents, not even 'missing ones'. In consequence, agreement -
whether syntactic or semantic- must be (and, as has been shown, can be) 
abandoned as a condition on pronominal anaphora. 
Nevertheless, one may argue that semantic rules which establish 
antecedent-anaphor relations should be given. In particular, what a 
pronoun occurrence in some context may refer to might be taken to 
depend on the existence of semantic coreference relations for some types 
of pronoun uses at least. One might even try to extend this approach to 
cover pronouns that have quantifier expressions as antecedents, i.e. 
antecedents which are not, in a sense, referring expressions. However, it 
tums out that pronouns are ordinarily used to pick up speaker referents 
and, furthermore, that fixing the reference of 'referring pronouns' with 
quantifier antecedents ('E-type pronouns') cannot in general be accom-
plished on the basis of semantic considerations alone. On the contrary, 
speaker intentions have to be admitted as a crucial factor in reference 
determination. From the point of view of a hearer, semantic considera-
tions, e.g. the specification ofwhich 'objects verify the sentence containing 
Bereitgestellt von | Institut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS) Bibliothek
Angemeldet | 193.196.8.102
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.13 11:09
406 B. Wiese 
the antecedent' (cf. above), may be most important in tracing out what a 
speaker using a pronoun intends to refer to; yet every kind of pragmatic 
or common-sense reasoning may be pertinent. 
Assurne that one might still want to adopt an approach based on a 
semantic concept of reference, leaving aside the role of speaker intentions 
as a 'complication of language use'. From the consideration of 'bound-
variable pronouns' it might appear that some semantic antecedent-ana-
phor relation is needed anyway. If this relation can be proved in the final 
analysis to be reducible to a relation of semantic coreference, it may seem 
profitable to take coreference of expressions as a basic feature for a wider 
class of pronoun occurrences. But even from a semantic point of view, in 
order to take care of 'bound-variable pronouns' we need not assume a 
grammatical relation between antecedent and anaphor qua linguistic 
expressions. Rather, pronouns can be taken to refer to referents available 
from 'the universe-of-discourse, which is created by the text' (Lyons 1977: 
670). Hence we have no reason to insist on a semantic coreference relation 
and can go back to a pragmatic approach by allowing pragmatic 
considerations to interact with semantic ones in determining which 
referents are available from the context. 
I submit that all versions of relational approaches must be abandoned. 
Instead, I adopt the view that the use of pronouns depends on their lexical 
specifications. What is required, then, are lexical entries for pronouns that 
specify their conceptual meanings and/or associative potential. Some 
sample entries were sketched above. Instead of racking our brains to solve 
the problern of where a linguistic antecedent that 'is not present in 
discourse ... can be located' (Tasmowski-De Ryck and Verluyten 1981: 
154), we should aim at a unified lexical description of pronouns that treats 
them as normal items in the vocabulary; their use is determined not by 
any antecedents in a sentence but by their properties as lexical items ofthe 
language. Pronouns only differ from 'normal definite nominals' in two 
respects: first, in the low conceptual content of their meanings; and 
second, in having a lexical 'associative potential' that is formally based 
and may serve to restriet the extension of pronoun meanings in pronoun 
use. 
Definite nominals, when used referentially, signal a speaker expectation 
that 'his audience will be able to recognize his reference' (Donnellan 1978: 
65; cf. also Hawkins 1978). There may be different reasons for thinking 
that an intended referent can actually be recognized. The definite nominal 
may have been used gesturally (Lieb 1979: 379),25 that is, accompanied 
by a pointing gesture of any kind - a movement of a band, a Iook at the 
object, etc. - thus the referent may have been singled out by the speaker; 
or the referent may have been mentioned before; or the referent may 
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simply be known to the addressee. It is tempting to identify anaphora as 
'nongestural use of definite nominals'. 'Anaphoric use' would not be 
made dependent on the existence of antecedents. No doubt, nongestural 
use does not presuppose antecedents, but notice that it does not presup-
pose the referenttobe in 'the universe-of-discourse which is created by the 
text' either. Assurne for example that a friend asks you what to do 
tonight. You may weil answer with (39) if you have reason to believe that 
he knows of the nice restaurant: 
(39) Let's go to the nice restaurant again. 
The referent of the nice restaurant is not supplied by the situational 
context-of-utterance, nor has it been mentioned before: it has not been 
established as a 'discourse referent' (Karttunen 1976) in advance. It does 
not have to be unique either (as e.g. with the earth): there may be more 
than one restaurant that the friend would call nice, but this is harmless as 
long as background knowledge is ordered in some way. (Possible referents 
may be accessible to differing degrees, and the amount of descriptive 
information needed for their identification will vary.) Quite generally, it is 
sufficient for referents of definite noun phrases that they be recognizable 
on the basis of whatever background knowledge there is - they must be 
identifiable in the speaker's 'reference basis' (Lieb 1979, 1980a). 
Nevertheless, we might wish to distinguish different uses of definite 
noun phrases in terms of the bases for referent recognition: (i) definite 
noun phrases 'introduced tout court' (Donnellan 1978: 64) where the 
speaker counts on the nonlinguistic background, (ii) definite noun phrases 
used gesturally where the speaker relies on paralinguistic means, and (iii) 
definite noun phrases used where the speaker relies on the linguistically 
created universe-of-discourse. Given the examples of anaphora in the 
literature, the third type seems to be a natural candidate for 'anaphoric 
use' and would also agree with the examples I have used in this paper. As 
Lyons (1977: 673) puts it, 'Anaphora presupposes that the referent should 
already have its place in the universe-of-discourse.' lt follows that definite 
nominals can be used in a way that does not qualify either as gestural or 
as anaphoric. This holds for 'full NPs' (as illustrated by [39]) as weil as for 
pronouns. Background knowledge alone may be sufficient to pick out the 
intended referent of a pronoun occurrence. For instance, somebody 
rushing to keep an appointment might burst into the room with the 
question 
(40) Has he already arrived? 
assuming that his addressee knows the second party in the appointment. 
lt is true, the low descriptive content of pronoun meanings severely 
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Iimits their use in referring to referents that are not in the universe-of-
discourse; referents for pronouns may be identified by gestures but are 
mostly introduced in the linguistic cotext. As should have become 
obvious, this is not meant to imply that the referents of anaphorically 
used pronouns have to have been introduced by means of anteceding 
nominals; cf. (41): 
(41) Does John have a car?- Yes, it is a Mustang. 
Following Karttunen (1976: 383), we may assume that 'indefinite NPs in 
yes-no questions ... do not establish referents'; on the contrary, the referent 
for it is available because the question has been answered positively. What 
it means for a referent 'to already have its place in the universe-of-
discourse' must be understood rather broadly. Fora further illustration Iet 
us return briefly to 'problems with number agreement' (cf. section 2). 
As noted already. with respect to cases of missing antecedents, the 
semantic interpretation of the complete cotext has to be taken into 
consideration. In (22) there are two destroyers under discussion; conse-
quently, a plural pronoun may be used to anaphorically refer to them. 
Similarly, in (18), two girls are under discussion; hence the inappropriate-
ness of her as an anaphor. Actually, her could have been used as an 
anaphor if the second conjunct in (18) had read in both cases I knew her. 
This emphasizes again that the semantic interpretation of the whole 
sentence (not only of a possibly existing antecedent) is pertinent to 
understanding the pronoun's reference; in contradistinction, examining 
whether a syntactic agreement condition is met would not be much help. 
Commenting on 'exceptions' to number agreement in German similar to 
(11), Hermann Paul (1919: § 169) already noted that a combination of a 
singular antecedent and a plural anaphor is not unusual whenever the 
clause containing the pronoun makes a general statement on the species 
to which the individual referred to by the antecedent belongs. This means, 
where an individual of some species is available in the universe-of-
discourse, this may suffice to subsequently refer tothat species, or rather 
all of its members, by a plural pronoun. Although the referents of the 
pronoun have not been introduced previously in a strict sense, we may 
say, that they are nevertheless retrievable from the universe-of-discourse. 
True, anaphora by pronouns means to resume the thread; however, such 
cases show that anaphorically used pronouns are not strictly limited to 
'point to structures in the model that has been constructed' (Stenning 
1978: 196). At least from the point of view of the hearer, they may add to 
the 'discourse model'. This may also be the case where the pronoun's 
referent has been introduced by means of an indefinite nominal; cf. (42): 
(42) Socrates owned a dog and it bit Socrates. 
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Evans (1980: 343) notes that it is due to the pronoun if (42) bears the 
implication that Socrates ownedjust one dog. Similarly, where he or she is 
used to refer to some person that has been referred to antecedently by, 
say, the teacher or Hilary (cf. Kamp 1981), this may add to the hearer's 
knowledge of the reference objects. 26 Compare also ( 13) where it or them 
may be used, although the antecedent this kind of animal is in the singular. 
Instead of being triggered by syntactic features of the antecedent, the 
choice of the pronoun teils the hearer how the speaker conceives of what 
he is talking about. Presumably, 'kinds are a bit like teams' and may be 
construed as individuals or as multiplicities ('all its members', Carlson 
1977: 435 n. 16) and may be referred to accordingly. 
Insofar as a pronoun has semantic content, it can be used informatively. 
Anyway, the cases considered exemplify use of pronouns where the 
linguistically created universe-of-discourse serves as the principal basis for 
referent recognition. Lyons (1977: 672) considers her in (43), too, to be 
anaphoric: 
(43) I was terribly upset to hear the news: I only saw her last week. 
where the context is offering condolences to a friend whose wife has just 
been killed in a car crash. It seems to me, however, that this would 
overextend the notion 'anaphora'. The referent for her, provided (43) is 
the complete discourse to be considered, is not available from the 
LINGUISTICALLY CREATED universe-of-discourse; when (43) is uttered in 
corresponding circumstances, her exemplifies the first type of use distin-
guished above (where the speaker relies on the nonlinguistic background). 
Admittedly, the tripartite distinction I have drawn may not always give 
clear and undebatable results, in particular since referents may be 
recognizable for more than one reason. There are also cases that are not 
yet covered. One such case can be found on a poster ofa German political 
party. The party's emblem is a hedgehog. There is a picture of a hedgehog 
on the poster with the caption (44): 
(44) Macht ihn stark. 
'Make it [masc.] strong.' 
Ihn is used because Igel, 'hedgehog', is masculine. A picture certainly does 
not qualify as a linguistic antecedent. Therefore, does (44) illustrate a kind 
of ostensive use- where Iayout replaces a pointing gesture to the picture 
- or is it a referent of a nonlinguistic sign that is picked up here? 
Distinguishing pronoun occurrences in terms of bases for reference 
recognition can be useful in order to throw into relief typical ways of 
using pronouns; it does not yield a clear-cut classification. The resulting 
vagueness is not a theoretical flaw, however, but reflects the nature of 
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reference. It is only 'by means ofvarious subtle contextual clues' (Kaplan 
1978: 229) that somebody else's intended referent can be identified, and 
pronoun use is no exception. No grammatical ambiguity of pronouns 
should be assumed to explain different types of pronoun use; and an 
antecedent-anaphor relation must not be taken to be essential to the 
description of pronouns if a uniform approach is to be realized. 
I conclude by comparing different ways of describing pronoun occur-
rences. Two theses may be suggested: 
( 45) A pronoun is used to refer to a referent that is assumed to be recog-
nizable for a hearer despite the low reference-determining potential of 
the pronoun (conceptual meaning and associative potential). 
(46) A pronoun is used to refer to a referent that is in the extension of 
some referential phrase in the linguistic cotext that agrees (in some 
sense) with the pronoun. 
( 45) attempts to characterize informally the use of definite pronouns in 
general, while (46) identifies a restricted subcase. Descriptions (47) to (49) 
characterize intermediate cases ofdecreasing.generality, which makes (46) 
the most specific: 
(47) A pronoun is used to refer to a referent that is retrievable from the 
universe-of-discourse created by the text. 
( 48) A pronoun is used to refer to a referent that has been introduced in 
the linguistic cotext. 
(49) A pronoun is used to refer to a referent that belongs to a class 
associated with some referential phrase in the linguistic cotext. 
(46) remains a subcase even if it should turn out to cover most pronoun 
occurrences. Forcing each and every pronoun occurrence into this mold 
would Iead to gross absurdities, as has been amply demonstrated by 
linguists looking for linguistic antecedents where there are none, and for 
agreement that does not exist. (47), it seems to me, pinpoints quite weil the 
phenomena that have usually been subsumed under the heading anaphora 
by pronouns. What should be rejected, then, is the idea that pronouns' 
referents may be 'computed' from the cotext, where antecedents are 
determined ideally by algorithmic procedures. I take the more realistic 
view that the referent of a pronoun is at best retrievable from the context, 
that is, may be discovered, with luck, by heuristic strategies. 
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Notes 
* This is a revised and expanded version of a paper read to the Linguistisches Kolloquium 
at the Freie Universität Berlin in May I 981. I am very grateful for comments and 
Suggestions on earlier versions to Peter Eisenberg, Dietrich Hartmann, Dietmar 
Rösler, Harald Weydt, and especially, to Hans-Heinrich Lieb. This paper could not 
have been written without relying heavily on the ideas presented in Lieb's studies (see 
references). Special thanks to Flora McGechan for helping me with my English. 
I. The way out that suggests itself in a transformational approach would be to derive 
sentences.like (I) from remote structures which do not contain split antecedents, i.e. 
where all antecedents are constituents. However, it could be shown that this is not a 
viable avenue for a number of reasons (for discussion see Dougherty I 969; see also 
Anderson I 970; Perlmutter and Ross I 970). 
2. The transformational approach also puts anaphoric personal pronouns on a par with 
reflexives, which would mean that both originale from Substitution. Dougherty's 
argument may therefore be strengthened by showing the nonuniformity of reflexives 
and anaphoric personal pronouns; cf. Wasow (1979). In more recent publications 
reflexives, as opposed to personal pronouns, are taken to constitute a type of 'bound 
anaphora'; see e.g. Helke (1970), Chomsky (1980b). In this paper I will not deal with 
reflexives. 
3. Cf. Chomsky (1980a: 281 n. 26): 'We may think of the term 'coreference' here as 
referring to a syntactic association of the two NPs that is a factor in their ultimate 
interpretation.' 
4. Agreement cannot be a sufficient condition, insofar as there are other conditions on 
anaphora- configurational conditions. Our way of speaking is justified, however, as 
we presuppose that conditions of other types, if there are any, are satisfied. 
5. Bach tried to demoostrate this by (i, ii) (1970: 121): 
(i) My neighbor who is pregnant said that she was very happy. 
(ii) My neighbor who is pregnant said that he was very happy. 
It is true, these examples do not prove the point. Obviously, it isamatter of fact, not of 
grammar, that a male neighbor is rather unlikely to be pregnant. But this does not 
affect the structure of the argument: the antecedent could not be taken as an NP that 
excludes a modifying relative clause IF correct choice of the pronoun may depend on 
grammatical properlies of this clause. 
6. From a purely formal point of view one could not deny the fact that there is a 'proper' 
antecedent for she in (21), viz. wife. It is due to considerations of semantic adequacy 
that one speaks of 'missing antecedents'. For other types of missing antecedents see 
Carden and Miller (1970) and Bresnan (1971). Some of their examples may be 
awkward from a stylistic point of view but would have to be in fact unintelligible if 
anaphora were a syntactically based phenomenon. 
7. The question of whether English exhibits grammatical gender has some tradition, cf. 
e.g. Hall (1951). 
8. Incidentally, the term 'natural gender' is often employed without appropriately 
distinguishing between (i) a semantic classification of words, (ii) a biological classifica-
tion of reference objects, and (iii) a classification of reference objects guided by the 
actual use of English personal pronouns. Cf. e.g. Stanley (1977: 43): 'Natural gender 
refers to the classification of nouns on the basis of biological sex, as female or male, or 
animate and inanimate.' 
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9. Hankamer and Sag (1976: 392 n. 5) introduced 'the cross-hatch (#) as an indication 
that the so marked sentence is incompatible with the indicated context (presuming, of 
course, the absence of any previous significant linguistic context).' 
10. This is naively assumed by Katz (1972: 371, n. 2), whose reliance on biological 
classifications invalidates his arguments for syntactic gender in English. Cooper, 
too, bases his semantic treatment of 'natural gender' on the assumption that 'natural 
gender or sex gender ... appears to be determined by the actual sex of the objects 
denoted or quantified over' (1975: 66, but seealso 134 n. 2). He assumes that in 'order 
to express natural gender we may divide the set of entities into three subsets or sorts 
which consist of the set of male entities, the set of female entities and the set of neuter 
entities' (1975: 67 f.). Thus he advocates what I call an 'objective-classification approach' 
below. 
II. Kruisinga (1932: 96 f.), who treats gender as a classification of expressions, put this as 
follows: 'the masculine may be considered the usual animate gender, both for names of 
male beings and others that have nothing to do with sex'. But seealso Stanley (1977: 
60-66). 
12. It is ships that are, in a sense, womanly, not ship that is feminine (contrary to Gruber 
1976: 287 f.), or as Martinet (1962: 16) put it, she may be used to refer to some machine 
English speakers choose to consider as 'female'. 
13. Lieb assumes that meanings of Iexemes are concepts in a psychological sense. The 
reconstruction of the notion of concept starts from individual perceptions and 
conceptions, that is, mental states. Any perception or conception has a content. As for 
perceptions, if somebody perceives some physical object, he attributes certain proper-
lies to what he perceives. The content of the person's perception is the set of these 
properties; similarly for conceptions. A concept is a property of perceptions and/or 
conceptions, viz. the property of being a perception in whose content a specific 
property occurs. For an outline of this approach and a demonstration of its linguistic 
adequacy see Lieb (1980b) (cf. also the references cited therein). The convention of 
using English words between raised dots as names of concepts is taken from Lieb 
(1979: 364). 
14. The pronoun it deserves a special treatment. Of course, in the case of so-called 
prosententialization it makes no sense to ask for agreement. Moreover, it is pretty clear 
that the existence of a CONSTITIJENT functioning as an antecedent is no condition for 
such uses of it (cf. Jackendoff 1972: 272). I have not relied on such facts in rejecting 
relational approaches to anaphora - although they strongly favor my argumentation 
-in order to avoid any impression of begging the question. To account for such uses 
we may have to posit an additional meaning for it. 
15. Put in another way, the respective meanings ofEnglish third-person personal pronouns 
are such that they can be ordered with respect to what has been called the 'animacy 
hierarchy' (Comrie 1981: eh. 9). They may also be fitted into Giv6n 's system of 'binary 
hierarchic relations', especially those that reflect 'the ego/anthropocentric nature of 
discourse' (Giv6n 1976: 152), though we had to use PERSONAL> NONPERSONAL in p1ace 
of his HUMAN>NONHUMAN and to add MANLY>WOMANLY. Note that these reJations 
are not naturally but socially based. 
16. It is not true that the 'pronoun used in referring to Mädchen will be sie- "she": 
formerly the neuter es was used but now sie is usual' (Corbett 1979: 205). Neverthe1ess, 
the facts conform to Corbett's theory of the agreement hierarchy (1979: 223): 'The 
further an element stands from its Controller in terms of syntactic distance, the more 
likely is semantic agrcement', although the formulation in terms of 'controller' and 
'semantic agreement' is misleading with respect to the case under discussion. 
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17. Giv6n has argued 'that agreement and pronominalization ... are fundamentally one 
and the same phenomenon' (1976: 151; italics mine). It is true, considerations of 
diachronic relationships and functional similarities may add to our understanding of 
the two phenomena. But there is certainly no reason to obscure the distinction with 
respect to langnage systems that in fact exhibit it. It is particularly unconvincing to 
construe personal pronouns (on one type ofuse) in Modem Standard English- where 
agreement plays nearly no role- as 'syntactic agreement pronouns' (Bosch 1980), i.e. 
as a sort of agreement morphemes. 
18. Stenning terms his approach a pragrnatic one, but he rejects a pragrnatic notion of 
reference as crucial for pronoun interpretation and stresses that in determining what a 
pronoun with an indefinite antecedent 'points to' 'no resort to "the object the speaker 
had in mind" is necessary, since objective criteria for identification can be stated' (1978: 
177); the 'logical force' of such a pronoun occurrence (though not its meaning) 'is 
partially a function of its context of occurrence, and ... therefore requires a pragrnatic 
approach' (1975: 189). However, it is not necessarily beyond the scope of a semantic 
approach to determine a pronoun's interpretation by considering the semantic 
interpretation of the (extrasentential) cotext (as demonstrated by Evans), and this is 
exactly what Stenning attempts in his discussion of antecedent-anaphor relations. In 
spite of its programmatic pragrnatic orientation, the treatment of pronoun occurrences 
like those under discussion is as semantic as Evans's and is thus open to similar 
objections (in addition, 'bound-variable pronouns', cf. below, are not taken care of 
satisfactorily). 
19. Most remarkably, Evans teils us (1977: 517 f.): 'In attempting to formalize the 
treatment of E-type pronouns ... , I shall ignore the wrinkle introduced by this 
liberalization. I hope it is obvious how it can be incorporated into the final product.' I 
think it is not obvious; rather, this claim seems to be a wrinkle indeed. 
20. Stress and intonation may be relevant but are not consid~red in this paper. 
21. I say 'available'- not 'introduced'- since a referent introduced in a subgame (cf. 
Hintikka and Carlson 1979) is available outside that subgame, if at all, only after it has 
been completed. 
22. Evans argues that no extra mechanism should be introduced to handle 'bound-variable 
pronouns' (although he assumes that there aredifferent 'kinds of pronouns', 1980: 
344). Variables, however, are but one such extra device. In fact, since pronouns as 
'devices for registering coreference' are really not needed to treat sentences like (35), a 
rule that establishes a coreference relation between pronouns and antecedents is 
another type of extra mechanism. (Yet another type are, for instance, Bosch's [1980] 
so-called syntactic agreement pronouns.) Evans's coreference approach would be 
required, if at all, only in the interpretation of quantified sentences. In short, Evans's 
extra-device argument applies to his own approach as weiL 
23. I have not entered into any detailed questions concerning a GTS analysis of anaphora 
and pronouns since it has not been my aim to provide a formal theory nor to argue for 
the GTS position in particular. The point is rather that a uniform approach to 
pronouns can be obtained if pronouns are construed as picking up individuals that are 
made available in the context. GTS is an example of a theory that can be so 
understood. Another one is Kamp's 'theory of truth and semantic interpretation' 
(Kamp 1981). Actually, both approaches are similar in a number of respects (e.g. as 
acknowledged by Kamp, the treatment of conditionals, or, more generally speaking, 
the idea of a subgamefsubrepresentation; compare also Kamp's discourse representa-
tions to the 'sets of simple sentences' in Hintikka and Saarinen 1979: 172 f.). Kamp 
advances 'the hypothesis that both deictic and anaphoric pronouns select their 
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referents from certain sets of antecedently available entities' (1981: 283), but he does 
not incorporate 'deictic pronouns' into his theory. Rather he assumes that if a text 
containing pronouns 'is used by itself, i.e. without preceding verbal introduction, and 
also in the absence of any act of demonstration, then - and this is another important 
hypothesis of our theory - there are no other potential referents for [the occurring 
pronouns] than the discourse referents that have been introduced in response to [other 
expressions within the discourse]' (1981: 285). 
As it stands, this is not entirely correct, since pronouns 'introduced toul court' (see 
below) are ignored. But if amended accordingly, we may apply Kamp's approach to 
Evans's argument: the hypothesis quoted then resolves the problern of isolating ß1 as 
the only possible referent for his in (36i) etc. notwithstanding that 'the syntactic 
analysis of a sentence of the present fragment [dealt with in Kamp's theory] teils us 
nothingabout anaphoric relations' (1981: 301). This is due to the fact that the fragment 
'contains neither variables nor indexed pronouns' (1981: 301) and thus is immune to 
the methodological objections raised in section I, above. Kamp's approach, then, can 
be extended to cover deictic pronouns in a similar way as GTS. 
24. One might try to define the stretch over which the game can be played in syntactic 
terms like c-command (Reinhart 1979; Evans 1980) and argue that configurational 
conditions play a significant role in anaphora. Note, however, that such conditions 
would define how the use of certain NPs (as e.g. every man) contributes to the 
momentary discourse model. They do not affect the interpretation of anaphorically 
used pronouns: as I said, these are always interpreted as picking up individuals that are 
made available in the context. (Configurational constraints that are not designed for 
'bound-pronoun' constellations can be dispensed with in favor of pragmatic explana-
tions anyhow, seeReinhart 1983.) 
25. Use of the term 'gestural' instead of Lyons's 'deictic' has the advantage of making 
available two different terms for two distinct types of 'pointing to the context', viz. 
pointing by virtue of the lexical meaning of words such as /, you, here, today, etc. 
(deixis in a narrow sense), and pointing by virtue ofnonverbal devices such as gestures 
in connection with 'referring expressions' (the ball, he, etc.). With pronouns that have 
deictic meanings, the referent has not to be looked for in the linguistically created 
universe-of-discourse but in the situational context-of-utterance. Thus, even though a 
pronoun like you may serve to refer to a referent that has been referred to before, this 
does not constitute a case of anaphora. 
26. Cf. also Germ. (i): 
(i) Helge sagte, daß er sehr glücklich sei. 
'Helge said that he was very happy.' 
Whereas Helge may be a name of a male or a female person, the use of er indicates that 
Helge is a male, which demonstrates again the need for conceptual meanings of 
pronouns even in the case of languages like German. 
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